Had the life and growth of the child in the womb been confined to that condition, then the existence of the child in the womb would have proved utterly abortive and unintelligible; as would the life of this world, were its deeds, actions and their results not to appear in the world to come.
(‘Abdu’l-Bahá in Bahá’í World Faith: page 393)
We ended the last post with this thought. Wynn Thomas captures what he feels is Thomas’s achievement as someone ‘writing the modern history of a soul’ in the following words:[1]
. . . This is the Thomas who seems to have fully discovered the natural idiom of his soul only late in his career, in his haunting religious poetry.
That just about summarises my response to R. S. Thomas’s achievement in this respect at least.
Even so, we have the third problem. It was hard for Thomas, in the absence of presence, to reconcile the elusive existence of God with the state of a world supposedly created out of his compassionate omnipotence – the theodicy problem basically.
As Wynn Thomas explains:[2]
Thomas was ever helpless to deny his nagging, underlying recognition of the cruelty of the laws governing the world of God’s creation.
The problem, in Wynn Thomas’s view was a torment to him:[3]
The problem of accounting for the overwhelming evidence of suffering in the world supposedly created by a God of love: it tormented R. S. Thomas his entire life.
Thomas is not the only poet, of course, who has been troubled by this issue.
Dickinson & War
Emily Dickinson’s poetic productivity peaked during the years of the American Civil War. Wolosky in A Historical Guide to Emily Dickinson explains: [4]
[M]ore than half of her poetic production coincides with years of the Civil War, 1861 to 1865. The years immediately preceding the war… were also the years which Thomas Johnson identifies with ‘the rising flood of her talent,’ as well as with the beginning of her reclusive practices.
There was an amazing peak in 1863 alone. Betsy Erkkila describes it as follows, in a later chapter:[5]
[O]f the 1789 poems in Franklin’s variorum edition, over half were written during the years of the Civil War between 1861 and 1865; and of these, almost 300 were written in 1863, a year of crisis and turning point in the war, when even Union victories such as Gettysburg had become scenes of horrific bloodletting and mass death on both sides.
It is not surprising that one of the main concerns of these poems is ‘theodicy’:[6]
The first striking feature of these war poems is the fundamental and commanding place they give to the problem of theodicy. Dickinson’s war poems generally attempt to make out ‘the anguish in this world’ and to decipher whether it has ‘a loving side.’ This would mean its fitting into some wider schema, some purpose that would justify suffering, giving it place and hence significance.
This was a testing struggle as in war death is[7] ‘arbitrary and recalcitrant.’ In fact:[8]
The Civil War reached levels of carnage before unknown, made possible both by new technology and new strategies of total warfare, in combination with a profound ideological challenge to American national claims and self identity, political and religious.
Shira Wolosky lists other writers, including some poets, similarly challenged:[9]
Dickinson’s work brings to awareness the importance of theodicy as a core literary (as well as philosophical and religious) structure, in, for example, Aeschylus, Augustine, and Milton, Herbert and Donne, or, closer to Dickinson, Melville and Hopkins.
In the end:[10]
Religion in many ways is a paradigm that fails Dickinson, and yet, she never completely discards it. If she is not devout, she is also not secular.… Dickinson’s work… engages in endless disputation, which is endlessly inconclusive.
Shades of R. S. Thomas here also, it seems.
Eternity
However, he does perhaps arrive at a solution which was not surprising to me:[11]
His strategy [in the end] was to foreground that very transcendent otherness of God, and to emphasise that when thus coolly viewed sub specie aeternitatis[12] the otherwise vivid world of human experience faded into ephemeral, illusory importance.
He made the additional point that ‘[Also] language could at best be but a darkling glass that inevitably muddled understanding.’
I was driven to address the same problem in a sequence of posts. I came to essentially the same conclusion:
In the end though, as the quote at the beginning of this post suggests, any consideration of suffering that fails to include a reality beyond the material leaves us appalled at what would seem the pointless horror of the pain humanity endures not only from nature but also from its own hands. I may have to come back to this topic yet again.
Within that context I tried to give suffering a more positive meaning and purpose:
If we could only come to see our pain and loss as providing us, as a gift, with the currency we will need when we travel, as we all must at some unknown point in the future, to settle in the undiscovered land from whose borders no traveller returns, it would become possible to accept it gratefully rather than resist it pointlessly. We would not then unwittingly destroy it, much to our disadvantage later. Without this currency, when we die we will be like refugees, ill-equipped at first to deal with the challenges of our new homeland. If we were to realise this, not just with our heads but with our hearts as well, we could then do as Bahá’u’lláh advises us and greet calamity with the same peace of mind as we welcome all good fortune. That would be true wisdom and real wealth.
I’m still not sure how successful I was in that attempt, as there is a catch here though for many of us mortals. Given that in evolutionary terms human beings have been around for a matter of minutes, our tribulations shrink in that perspective. Clearly they would shrink to nothing in the light of eternity. However, as it’s hard for our primate brains to grasp the billions of years it has taken for us to arrive on the scene, to place them in the context of an eternity in which we have no faith, given the prevalent materialistic perspective on the world, is understandably impossible. As we dismiss the afterlife as a delusional consolation what little hope we may have can be all too easily torpedoed.
However, it seems to me that unless we do find a way not only to confront the issue of a hidden God, and the veils it implies, but also the related one of theodicy, it’s hard to hold onto a positive set of values and any sense of meaning in this traumatically troubled world we wander through.
In the end I do think there is any other way to get past the theodicy problem except through the perspective of an eternal after life. John Hatcher, one of the translators of Táhirih whose work we started from earlier in this sequence, explains it in this way in a post on the Bahá’í Teachings website:
Everyone, sooner or later, asks the age-old question: does an omnipotent, all-knowing God cause—or at least fail to stop—the suffering of the innocent?
Several major principles in the Baha’i writings urge us toward a solution to this substantial dilemma. For example, God is not restricted to this physical life in rectifying injustices we have suffered in our individual lives, nor is God limited to a certain span of time for working out justice in history, as we have noted earlier in this series of essays.
This observation may seem obvious, but it is the single most critical factor in coming to terms with theodicy—the important question of why a good Creator permits evil to exist. It means that we cannot possibly evaluate or judge what befalls us or anyone else in terms of what they endure in their earthly experience. Whether suffering ultimately results in justice or injustice, something beneficial or harmful, would be similar to our attempting to assess how someone will fare in their occupation while they are still in a formative stage within the mother’s womb.
Since our fruition is destined for another plane of existence, we can hardly assess what does and does not benefit that process, any more than a fruit tree could evaluate the beneficial results of its own pruning.
And that is probably about as far as we can take it in this sequence.
References and Footnotes
[1]. R. S. Thomas: Serial Obsessive – page 10.
[2]. R. S. Thomas to Rowan Williams: The Spiritual Imagination in Modern Welsh Poetry – page 208.
[3]. Op. cit. – page 210.
[4]. A Historical Guide to Emily Dickinson – page 107.
[5]. Op. cit. – page 158.
[6]. Op. cit. – page 111.
[7]. Op. cit. – page 112.
[8]. Op. cit. – page 125.
[9]. Op. cit. – pages 113-114.
[10]. Op. cit. – page 116.
[11] Op. cit. – page 210.
[12]. From Wikipedia: ‘Sub specie aeternitatis (Latin for “under the aspect of eternity”)[1] is, from Baruch Spinoza onwards, an honorific expression denoting what is considered to be universally and eternally true, without any reference to or dependence upon temporal facets of reality. The Latin phrase can be rendered in English as “from the perspective of the eternal”. More loosely, it is commonly used to refer to an objective (or theoretically possible alternative) point of view.’